This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives a private payoff shock which is independently and identically distributed across players and periods. We focus on the purifiability of a class of one-period memory mixed strategy equilibria used by Ely and Välimäki (2002) in their study of the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring. We find that the strategy profile is purifiable by perturbed-game finite-memory strategies if and only if it is strongly symmetric, in the sense that after every history, both players play the same mixed action. Thus "most" strategy profiles are not purifiable by finite memory strategies. However, if we allow infinite memory strategies in the perturbed game, then any completely-mixed equilibrium is purifiable.
Introduction
purification theorem is one of the most compelling justifications for the study of mixed equilibria in finite normal form games. Under this justification, the complete-information normal form game is viewed as the limit of a sequence of incomplete-information games, where each player's payoffs are subject to private shocks. Harsanyi proved that every equilibrium (pure or mixed) of the original game is the limit of equilibria of close-by games with incomplete information. Moreover, in the incomplete-information games, players have essentially strict best replies, and so will not randomize. Consequently, a mixed strategy equilibrium can be viewed as a pure strategy equilibrium of any close-by game of incomplete information. Harsanyi's (1973) argument exploits the regularity (a property stronger than local uniqueness) of equilibria of "almost all" normal form games. As long as payoff shocks generate small changes in the system of equations characterizing equilibrium, the regularity of equilibria ensures that the perturbed game has an equilibrium close to any equilibrium of the unperturbed game. 1 Very little work has examined purification in dynamic games. Even in finite extensive games, generic local uniqueness of equilibria may be lost when we build in natural economic features into the game, such as imperfect observability of moves and time separability of payoffs. Bhaskar (2000) has shown how these features may lead to a failure of local uniqueness and purification: i.e., for a generic choice of payoffs, there is a continuum of mixed strategy equilibria, none of which are the limit of the pure strategy equilibria of a game with payoff perturbations.
For infinitely repeated games, the bootstrapping nature of the system of equations describing many of the infinite horizon equilibria is conducive to a failure of local uniqueness of equilibria. We study a class of symmetric one-period memory mixed strategy equilibria used by Ely and Välimäki (2002) in their study of the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring. This class fails local uniqueness quite dramatically: there is a two dimensional manifold of equilibria.
Our motivation for studying the purifiability of this class of strategies comes from the recent literature on repeated games with private monitoring. Equilibrium incentive constraints in games with private monitoring are difficult to verify because calculating best replies typically requires understanding the nature of players' beliefs about the private histories of other players. Piccione (2002) showed that by introducing just the right amount of mixing in every period, a player's best replies can be made independent of his beliefs, and thus beliefs become irrelevant. 2 This means in particular that these equilibria of the perfect monitoring game trivially extend to the game with private monitoring. Piccione's (2002) strategies depend on the infinite history of play. Ely and Välimäki (2002) showed that it suffices to consider simple strategies which condition only upon one period memory of both players' actions. These strategies again make a player indifferent between his actions regardless of the action taken by the other player, and thus a player's incentives do not change with his beliefs. Kandori and Obara (2003) also use such strategies to obtain stronger efficiency results via private strategies in repeated games with imperfect public monitoring.
At first glance, the equilibria of Piccione (2002) and Ely and Välimäki (2002) involve unreasonable randomizations: in some cases, a player is required to randomize differently after two histories, even though the player has identical beliefs over the continuation play of the opponent. 3 Moreover, the randomizations involve a delicate intertemporal trade-off. While there are many ways of modelling payoff shocks in a dynamic game, these shocks should not violate the structure of dynamic game. In repeated games, a reasonable constraint is that the payoffs shocks should be independently and identically distributed over time, and moreover, the period t shock should only be realized at the beginning of period t. Our question is: Do the delicate intertemporal trade-offs survive these independently and identically distributed shocks?
Our results show that, in the repeated game with perfect monitoring, most (but not all) of the Ely-Välimäki equilibria can only be purified by infinite horizon strategies, i.e., strategies that are no simpler than those of Piccione (2002) . However, while equilibria of the unperturbed perfect monitoring game are automatically equilibria of the unperturbed private monitoring game, our purification arguments do not automatically extend to the private monitoring case. We conjecture-but have not been able to prove-that in the repeated game with private monitoring all the Ely-Valimaki equilibria will be not be purifiable with finite history strategies but will be purifiable with infinite history strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the completely mixed equilibria of the repeated prisoners' dilemma introduced by Ely and Välimäki (2002) . The positive and negative purification results for finite history strategies are in Section 3. In Section 4, we present the positive purification result for infinite history strategies. Finally, in Section 5, we briefly discuss the private monitoring case.
Belief-free Equilibria with Perfect Monitoring
Let Γ (0) denote the infinitely-repeated perfect-monitoring prisoners' dilemma with stage game:
Each player has a discount rate δ. The class of symmetric mixed strategy equilibria Ely and Välimäki (2002) construct can be described as follows: The profiles have oneperiod memory, with players randomizing in each period with probability p aa on C after the action profile aa . The profile is constructed so that after each action profile, the player is indifferent between C and D. Consequently, a player's best replies are independent of his beliefs about the opponent's history, and in this sense the equilibria are, to use the language introduced by Ely, Hörner, and Olszewski (2003) "belief-free." The requirement that after aa , player 1 is indifferent between playing C and D, when player 2 is playing p a a yields the following system (where W aa is the value to a player after aa , and the second equality in each displayed equation comes from the indifference requirement):
and
Subtracting (2) from (1) gives
Since at least two of the probabilities differ (if not, p aa = 0 for all aa ), the coefficient of p aa and the constant term are both zero:
Ely and Välimäki (2002) instead work with the values to a player of having his opponent play C and D this period,V C andV D . A player is indifferent between C and D when the opponent plays C if
while he is indifferent between C and D when the opponent plays D if
These two equalities are equivalent to (9) and (10), and so (1-8) imply the player is indifferent between C and D, when the opponent is playing C this period, and when he is playing D this period.
Under (9) and (10), the eight equations (1-8) reduce to four (substituting for W DC and W DD ):
Treating W CC and W CD parametrically, each equation determines a probability, and so we have a two dimensional manifold of equilibria (the proof is in the Appendix):
Theorem 1 There is a two-dimensional manifold of mixed equilibria of the infinitelyrepeated perfect monitoring prisoners' dilemma: Suppose W CC , W CD ∈ (0, 1) satisfy the inequalities
(1 − δ) < δW CD .
Then, the profile in which player 1 plays C with probability p aa and player 2 plays C with probability p a a after aa in the previous period (and both players play p CC in the first period), where
is an equilibrium. Moreover, (15), (16), and (17) are satisfied for any 0 < W CD < W CC < 1, for δ sufficiently close to 1.
Indeed, for each specification of behavior in the first period, there is a two-dimensional manifold of equilibria. Our analysis applies to all of these manifolds, and for simplicity, we focus on the profiles where both players play p CC in the first period.
For later reference, it is useful to note that, using (9) and (10), the expressions for the probabilities can be written as, for all aa ,
Finite memory purification
We now argue that if we require that the equilibrium of the perturbed game have finite history dependence, then it is only possible to purify equilibria of the type described in Section 2 when they are strongly symmetric (ie., when p CD = p DC ). Let Γ (ε) denote the infinitely-repeated perfect-monitoring prisoners' dilemma with stage game:
The payoff shock z i t is private to player i, realized in period t, uniformly distributed on [0, 1], independently and identically distributed across players, and histories.
We begin by considering one period memory strategy profiles, where the probability of a player playing C after observing the action profile aa last period is denoted by π ε aa . For simplicity we restrict attention to symmetric equilibria, where both players adopt the same strategy. Finally, we focus on completely mixed equilibria, where π ε aa ∈ (0, 1) for every action profile aa .
Denote the marginal type byẑ i t . If z t i ≥ẑ i t , then i plays C, and plays D otherwise. Then the probability of C is Pr z i t ≥ẑ i t = 1 −ẑ i t . Let W ε aa denote the ex ante value function of a player at the action profile aa , before the realization of his payoff shock. The ex post payoff from C after CC, and given the realization of z 1 t , is
while the payoff from D after CC is
Sinceẑ 1 t is indifferent,
Collecting terms gives
Similarly, the payoff from C after DD is
and since π ε DD = 1 −ẑ 1 t ,
Since the equations (24) and (25) have the same structure, if π ε CC = π ε DD , it must be that the coefficient of π ε and the constant are both zero:
In other words,
Turning to the other histories, the payoff from C after CD (so that the opponent sees the history DC) is
and since π ε CD = 1 −ẑ 1 t ,
The first two terms in the above equation have the same structure as in (24), and since the constant term and the coefficient on π ε in (24) are both zero, these two terms vanish. Thus (29) cannot be true for ε > 0 unless π ε CD = π ε DC .
Theorem 2 Let p be a mixed strategy equilibrium of the game with complete information that has one period memory (such as an Ely-Valimaki strategy profile). If p a ∈ (0, 1) and p CC = p DD and p CD = p DC , then there existsε > 0 such that for all ε ∈ (0,ε), there is no equilibrium of Γ (ε) with finite memory withinε of p.
Consider a profile with memory K, and suppose it is within δ of p. Let π ε h be the probability of C after the history h. Then, π ε h ∈ (0, 1) for all h ∈ {C, D} 2K , π ε hCC = π ε hDD and π ε hDC = π ε hCD . Then the contradiction obtained above for 1-period profiles also arises after the four histories hCC, hCD, hDC, and hDD, where h ∈ {C, D} 2(K−1) .
We have established that if p CC and p DD are distinct, a necessary condition for purifiability by finite memory strategies is that p must be strongly symmetric, i.e. both players must play the same continuation strategy after every history, even if this history is asymmetric.
Purification when p DC = p CD
It is possible to purify when p CD = p DC , since in this case we may choose π ε CD = π ε CD in the perturbed game, so that (29) is equivalent to (24), with π ε DC replacing π ε CC . There is thus no inconsistency between the conditions for optimality at the four information sets, CC, CD, DC, and DD. Let us assume that the ex ante value functions satisfy (27) and (28). This, in conjunction with π ε CD = π ε CD immediately implies that optimality is satisfied at all four information sets. It remains to show that we can choose the strategy profile π ε in order to generate these ex ante values.
In order to calculate the ex ante values, we need to take into account the dependence of choice on the realized value of the payoff shock. Note first that V aa (z 1
and so (using (23))
Rearranging,
and using (26) and
Proceeding similarly from the value equation for W ε CD , and using (27) and (28), we have
From the value equation for W ε DD ,
Thus it suffices to find π ε CC , π ε CD , and π ε DD which solve the quadratics (31), (32) and (33), and which converge to p CC , p CD , and p DD as ε → 0. We set W ε DD = W DD , and W ε CC = W CC , the values in the unperturbed game for the equilibrium we want to purify. The result then follows from the following lemma (and (22)):
Lemma 1 Let x ε solve the quadratic,
where a ε , b ε , and c ε all converge as ε → 0, and lim ε→0 a ε = 0 and lim ε→0 b ε = 0. Suppose moreover that a ε , b ε , and c ε are all differentiable functions of ε in a neighborhood of 0, with well-defined limits as ε → 0, and lim ε→0 a ε = 0. Then,
Proof. Solving the quadratic gives two candidate solutions for x ε :
Since the denominator goes to zero as ε → 0, only the positive root yields a well-defined solution for x ε in the limit. In this case, both numerator and denominator go to zero, and an application of l'Hopital's rule completes the proof.
Thus, we have a purification, for any values of W ε DD and W ε CC in the unperturbed game. Since any completely mixed symmetric equilibrium can be parametrized by these two values, we have shown that any such equilibrium can be purified by one period memory strategies in the perturbed game. We state this result as the following theorem:
Theorem 3 Let p = (p CC , p CD , p DC , p DD ) be a symmetric completely mixed one period memory equilibrium of the unperturbed game Γ(0), with p CD = p DC . There existsε > 0 so that for ε <ε, there exists π ε = (π ε CC , π ε CD , π ε DC , π ε DD ), a symmetric one period memory equilibrium of Γ(ε), and π ε → p as ε → 0.
Theorems 2 and 3 show that a strategy is purifiable by finite memory strategies if and only if it is strongly symmetric, i.e., at every information set, the two players must play the same mixed action. This also has implications for the payoffs that may be sustained. In the unperturbed game, any values in the unit interval that satisfy (9) and (10) are equilibrium values. In consequence, if δ > max{ g 1+g , 1+ }, any value in (0, 1) is an equilibrium value. In the perturbed game, the restriction W CD = W CD implies that we require δ > g+ 1+g+ . Thus, supporting a non-degenerate set of values requires a higher discount factor.
Purification with infinite memory
We now argue that, when we allow the equilibrium of the perturbed game to have infinite history dependence, then it is possible to purify equilibria of the type described in Section 2. Fix an equilibrium with interior probabilities, p CC , p CD , p DC , and p DD ∈ (0, 1).
We first partition the set of histories, H, into equivalence classes where behavior is identical on elements of the partition. All histories with the same last action profile aa different from CC are equivalent; denote the associated element of the partition by (aa , 0). We write this as haa ∈ (aa , 0) for all h and aa = CC. Two histories ending in CC are equivalent if the most recent action profile different from CC in the two histories is the same, aa say, and if the same number of occurrences of CC occur in the two histories after the last non -CC action profile, aa . Denote the associated element of the partition by (aa , k), where k is the number of occurrences of CC after the last non-CC action profile, aa . Finally, if h is the k-period history in which CC has been played in every period, we write (CC, k) for the singleton element of the partition containing h. Note that the null history is (CC, 0). Note that, any history in an element of the partition (aa , k) with k ≥ 1 ends in CC.
The strategy in the perturbed game will be measurable with respect to the partition on H just described. Fix ε > 0 and let π ε aa (k) denote the probability with which C is played when h ∈ (aa , k), and let W ε aa (k) denote the ex ante value function of the player at this history. If π ε aa (k) is a sequence (as ε → 0) of equilibria purifying p = (p CC , p CD , p DC , p DD ), then π ε aa (k) → p CC for all k ≥ 1 and all aa , and p ε aa (0) → p aa , as ε → 0. We will indeed show a uniform form of purifiability: the bound on ε required to make π ε aa (k) close to p CC is independent of k. The idea is that in the perturbed game, the payoff after a history ending in CC can always be adjusted to ensure that the appropriate realization of z in the previous period is the marginal type to obtain the desired randomization between C and D. We proceed recursively, fixing probabilities after any history in an element of the partition (aa , 0) at their unperturbed levels, i.e., we set π ε aa (0) = p aa . In particular, players randomize in the first period with probability p CC on C, and in the second period after a realized action profile aa = CC with probability p aa on C. 4 This turns out to determine the value function at histories in (aa , 0) for all aa ; we write W ε aa for W ε aa (0). In the second period after CC, W ε CC (1) is determined by the requirement that the ex ante probability that a player play C in the first period is given by π ε CC (0) = p CC . Given the value W ε CC (1), the probability π ε CC (1) is then determined by the requirement that W ε CC (1) be the ex ante value at the history CC. More generally, given a history h ∈ (aa , k) and a further realization of CC, W ε aa (k + 1) is determined by the requirement that the ex ante probability that a player play C in the previous period is given by π ε aa (k) = p aa , and then π ε aa (k + 1) is then determined by W ε aa (k + 1). We begin with histories in (aa , 0). Recalling the calculations that led to (30),
As we indicated above, (34), (35), and (36) can be solved for W ε CD , W ε DC , and W ε DD . Moreover, these solutions converge to W CD , W DC , and W DD (since these are the only solutions to (3), (5) and (7) for fixed p DC , p CD , and p DD ). It remains to determine W ε aa (k) and π ε aa (k) for k ≥ 1 (W ε CC (0) is also determined, since π ε CC (0) = p CC ). At the history h = (a a, k − 1), the player with payoff realization z = 1 − π ε a a (k − 1) must be indifferent between C and D:
Solving for W ε a a (k) as a function of π ε aa (k − 1) and π ε a a (k − 1) gives
where
Theorem 4 Let pp = (p CC , p CD , p DC , p DD ) be a symmetric completely mixed one period memory equilibrium of the unperturbed game Γ(0). For all η > 0, there is exists ε (η) > 0 such that for all ε < ε(η), the equilibrium of the perturbed game Γ(ε) given by the probabilities π ε aa (k) described above satisfies
Proof. The proof of l'Hospital's rule (see Rudin (1976, p. 109 ), for example) shows the following: Suppose f and g are differentiable on (a, b), g (x) = 0 for all x ∈ (a, b), and there exists δ : [0,η] → + for someη > 0 such that |x − a| < δ(η) implies |f (x)/g (x) − A| < η for some A for all η ∈ (0,η). If f and g are continuous on [a, b) with f (a) = g(a) = 0, then |f (x)/g(x) − A| < η for all |x − a| < δ(η) and η ∈ (0,η).
Consequently, it is enough to show that δ can be chosen independently of k in the application of Lemma 1. To apply Lemma 1, we also need to show that b ε and c ε have well-defined limits as ε → 0.
From (34), (35), and (36), there exists κ aa such that W ε aa = W aa + κ aa ε for all aa = CC. Fix η < min{p CC /3, p CD , p DC , p DD }. We proceed by induction. We first prove the inductive step, and then the initial step. κ DD )ε). Hence, system of equations to simple difference equations, and somewhat different arguments are required to deal with private monitoring.
We conjecture that the infinite horizon purification results would extend using general methods for analyzing infinite systems of equations. Intuitively, private monitoring will make purification by finite history strategies much harder, as there will be many different histories that will presumably give rise to different equilibrium beliefs that must lead to identical mixed strategies being played, and this should not typically occur. This argument can be formalized for one period histories, but we have not established the argument for arbitrary finite history strategies. However, we believe that the finite history restriction may place very substantial bounds on the set of mixed strategies that can be purified in general repeated games, and we hope to pursue this issue in later work.
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Solving (11-14) for the probabilities gives (18-21). By construction, all relevant incentive constraints are satisfied, so it only remains to verify that (15), (16), and (17) imply that the quantities described by (18-21) are indeed well-defined probabilities. Observe first that p CC > 0, since
which is implied by (16). This then implies that every denominator is positive (since W CC ≤ 1). Moreover, under this assumption, p CC < 1, since
which is always satisfied (since W CD ≥ 0). Turning to the next quantity, p DC > 0, since
which always holds. Moreover, p DC < 1, since
(1 − δ) + W CD − δW CD < (1 − δ) (1 + ) + δ (W CC − W CD )
which is (15). We also have p CD > 0, since 0 < (1 − δ) ( − g/δ) + W CC − δW CD ⇐⇒ δW CD + (1 − δ) g/δ < (1 − δ) + W CC , which is (16). Moreover, p CD < 1, since
Finally, p DD > 0 is equivalent to (17), and p DD < 1 is implied by (15), since
(1 − δ) (1 − 1/δ) + W CD − δW CD < (1 − δ) (1 + ) + δ (W CC − W CD ) ⇐⇒ W CD − δW CC < (1 − δ) (1 + δ) /δ.
